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COMMENT 
STAY TUNED: 
WHETHER CLOUD-BASED SERVICE PROVIDERS 
CAN HAVE THEIR COPYRIGHTED CAKE  
AND EAT IT TOO 
Amanda Asaro* 
 
Copyright owners have the exclusive right to perform their works 
publicly and the ability to license their work to others who want to share 
that right.  Subsections 106(4) and (5) of the Copyright Act govern this 
exclusive public performance right, but neither subsection elaborates on 
what constitutes a performance made “to the public” versus one that 
remains private.  This lack of clarity has made it difficult for courts to apply 
the Copyright Act consistently, especially in the face of changing 
technology.   
Companies like Aereo, Inc. and AereoKiller, Inc. developed novel ways 
to transmit content over the internet to be viewed instantly by their 
subscribers and declined to procure the licenses that would have been 
required if these transmissions were being made “to the public.”  However, 
while these companies claimed that their activities were outside of the 
purview of § 106(4) and (5), their rivals, copyright owners, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court disagreed.  Likening Aereo to a cable company for purposes 
of § 106(4) and (5), the Supreme Court determined that the company would 
need to pay for the material it streamed.  Perhaps more problematic for 
Aereo (and other similar companies) is the fact that the Court declined to 
categorize Aereo as an actual cable company, such that it would qualify to 
pay compulsory licensing fees—the more affordable option given to cable 
companies under § 111—to copyright holders. 
This Comment shows that, while the Court correctly ruled that 
companies like Aereo and AereoKiller should pay for the content 
transmitted, its failure to address whether Aereo is a cable company could 
frustrate innovation to the detriment of the public.  It suggests, therefore, 
that these companies should be required to pay for the content that they 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2015, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2010, Fordham 
University.  I would like to thank Professor Ron Lazebnik for his guidance and insight 
throughout all of the stages of the writing and research process.  I also thank my family and 
friends for their unyielding love, support, and patience. 
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transmit in the same way that cable companies do until Congress develops 
another system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Gone are the days of the 1990s when people carried Discmans to work 
while they played their newly purchased compact discs.  Almost gone are 
the days of the iPod Classics playing music paid for with iTunes gift cards.  
Now, people walk to work and to school clutching their iPhones and iPads, 
streaming music through Pandora, Spotify, and iTunes Radio on the go.  
When people get home, they have a full array of television shows at their 
fingertips through premium cable subscriptions that provide a plethora of 
specialty channels, some of which they have already recorded with their 
DVRs so that they can fast forward through commercials.  Then, the “On 
Demand” option allows people to order the latest movies and shows.  If all 
else fails, a backup Netflix or Hulu subscription may provide some solace. 
In the age of Netflix, Pandora, and iTunes, streaming content over the 
internet seems like an acceptable, cost-effective way to provide content to 
subscribers.  With subscriptions to many music or cable services, users may 
easily listen to, watch, and record programs.  In a world where nearly every 
form of entertainment is accessible at a person’s fingertips—and even on 
the go—what could go wrong?  From a consumer’s perspective, not much.  
For a paltry $7.99 per month Netflix subscription, for instance, a consumer 
gains access to over 9000 programs.1  In certain instances, providers of 
these programs do not face problems either.  In Netflix’s case, the company 
pays Disney,2 Miramax,3 and the rest of the entertainment companies that 
own the copyrights to the much-coveted films and television programs so 
that it has the rights to stream every film and program to subscribers.4 
Copyright law has protected copyright holders in certain instances by 
requiring companies like Netflix to obtain licenses before streaming content 
over the internet to its users.5  However, other copyright holders would 
assert that copyright law has failed to protect them from innovative 
companies that have developed technology beyond what Congress, in 1976, 
contemplated during the Copyright Act’s6 last major revision.7  Cloud-
based service providers, such as Aereo, Inc.8 and AereoKiller, Inc.,9 which 
 
 1. Nicole Goodkind, Netflix Introduces New Pricing Plan:  Another Qwikster Disaster 
or the Right Move?, YAHOO! FINANCE BLOG (Apr. 25, 2013, 3:27 PM), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/netflix-introduces-pricing-plan-another-
qwikster-disaster-192747662.html. 
 2. Erica Orden et al., Disney Deal Puts Netflix in Pay-TV Big League, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 5, 2012, at B1. 
 3. Drew Fitzgerald, Netflix to Stream Miramax Movies, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2011, at 
B5. 
 4. See generally GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET 
§ 5.05 (3d ed. 2013). 
 5. See id. 
 6. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541–2598 (1976) (codified in sections of 17 
U.S.C.). 
 7. See generally WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 8. See id.; Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
 9. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 
1138, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
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developed systems to stream content over the internet to be viewed in real 
time without first obtaining permission, illustrate this notion.  Based out of 
New York City and Los Angeles, respectively, these companies allow 
subscribers to view live or slightly delayed streams of over-the-air 
television to internet-connected devices without requiring the subscribers to 
have a separate cable subscription.10  Subscribers may order shows with 
any internet-connected device, like a laptop computer or smartphone, and 
for $8 per month, have the ability to stream up to twenty hours of live 
television (or, for $12 per month, up to sixty hours of live television) to any 
device they choose.11 
While it may appear to the average consumer that yet another type of 
entertainment service is available to provide their desired content on the go, 
the implications may be more severe from the cable broadcasters’ 
perspective.12 As companies like Aereo and AereoKiller stream content 
without paying for the licenses and attract more consumers, cable 
broadcasters—and those who own the copyrights for the programs being 
streamed—stand to lose customers who can access the same content 
elsewhere for a much lower price. 
In the same way that Netflix pays Disney and Miramax to access their 
copyrighted works, cable companies pay copyright holders to transmit their 
copyrighted works to subscribers.13  Until June 2014, when the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided against Aereo and in favor of copyright holding 
networks in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo 
II),14 Aereo and AereoKiller did not pay copyright holders for access to 
these materials but rather were able to stream the same locally broadcasted 
programs by catching the cable broadcasters’ signals and retransmitting 
them to subscribers.15  While Aereo and AereoKiller are limited in the 
programs that they can offer viewers to those that are broadcasted locally, 
they did not pay for the content that they stream, and therefore they were 
able to provide relatively inexpensive access to the same programs provided 
through a more expensive cable subscription.16  Aereo and AereoKiller 
argued that § 106(4) of the Copyright Act, which prohibits companies from 
“performing” copyrighted content “publicly” without first obtaining 
permission and paying a fee, did not apply to what they alleged was 
“private” streaming.17  They contended that they were simply providing 
technology that allowed consumers to do what they are legally entitled to 
 
 10. Frequently Asked Questions, AEREO, http://web.archive.org/web/20140507191343/ 
https://aereo.com/faqs (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See generally Lee Gesmer, Aereo, Antenna Farms and Copyright Law:  Creative 
Destruction Comes to Broadcast TV, 18 CYBERSPACE LAW. 16 (2013). 
 13. See Orden, supra note 2. 
 14. 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2499 (2014). 
 15. See id. at 2503. 
 16. See id. 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012); see also WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 
682 (2d Cir. 2013); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. 
Supp. 2d 1138, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 
373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
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do:  access free and legally accessible over-the-air television broadcasts 
using an antenna.18  Prior to the Court’s decision, both companies had been 
able to avoid paying fees to cable broadcasters or to other copyright 
holders.19  Suits against Aereo and AereoKiller highlight the challenges of 
policing traditional copyright protections in a time of sophisticated and 
growing technologies and how the courts have struggled to do so. 
According to the New York Times, the use of Aereo and copycat services 
had the potential to cost networks like ABC more than $2 billion per year in 
retransmission fee revenues—an amount projected to grow to $6 billion per 
year by 2018.20  While these companies threatened the cable broadcast 
business model, business models must often evolve in the face of 
technology.  Arguably more dangerous is that, even in its recent decision in 
Aereo II, the Court declined to opine on how its holding would influence 
similar technologies and did not provide a clear standard for what 
constitutes a public performance—something that companies developing 
new technologies surely would like to follow. 
This Comment assesses how courts have determined whether an online 
service provider, at the request of an individual subscriber, may transmit 
copyright-protected, but publicly available content over the internet to be 
viewed in real time by the requesting individual subscriber.  Part I provides 
a brief overview of the copyright doctrine, explaining its origins and how it 
has developed in response to technology. Part I also examines the concept 
of “public performance,” with a specific focus on the “Transmit Clause,” 
and provides an overview of compulsory licensing schemes and why they 
were adopted. 
Part II focuses on the Court’s interpretation of public performance in 
Aereo II.  This part focuses on the majority’s reliance on legislative history 
and the reasoning behind the 1976 Copyright Act amendments to impart 
meaning to “public performance.”  It then discusses the dissenting opinion 
and how, despite noting the majority’s shortcomings, the dissent similarly 
failed to provide a clear standard for what activities constitute a public 
performance. 
Part III discusses how the Court correctly applied the Copyright Act in 
Aereo II, but how its failure to address whether Aereo, Inc. is a cable 
company is problematic.  It proposes that Congress adopt a compulsory 
licensing scheme specific to cloud-based service providers. In the 
meantime, however, this Comment argues that it is within the Court’s 
discretion to apply the Act so as to advance its dual purposes:  to contribute 
to the public’s benefit and to foster creativity and innovation. 
 
 18. See WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 682; BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1143; Am. 
Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 375. 
 19. See WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 682; BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1143; Am. 
Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 375. 
 20. Brian Stelter, TV Circling the Wagons Over Aereo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2013, at 
B1. 
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I.   THE DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTIONS 
This part describes the historical and statutory framework for evaluating 
the Copyright Act of 197621 before considering how recent courts have 
interpreted the public performance doctrine.  Part I.A describes the 
historical roots of copyright protections, with a specific focus on the birth of 
the public performance right.  Part I.B explains how the public performance 
right has changed over time.  Part I.C then introduces how courts have 
interpreted the public performance doctrine recently and provides an 
overview of the technologies used by cable companies and cloud-based 
service providers to transmit content to their subscribers. 
A.   Copyright Protections and the History of the Public Performance Right 
Part I.A briefly introduces the nature of copyrights and what they confer 
to copyright holders.  Then, this section discusses the framework for 
analyzing copyright issues, noting how courts have considered the purpose 
of copyright laws and how Congress has amended copyright law to account 
for technological improvements. 
1.   The Nature of Copyrights and the Rights Conferred 
to Copyright Holders 
Copyrights are exclusive rights granted to the creator of an original 
work.22  These rights exist only for original works that are fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression, such as in a book or on a computer’s hard 
drive.23  So long as these works are fixed in some physical medium, 
protection extends to literary works; musical works; dramatic works; 
pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and 
architectural works.24  However, the copyright protections also apply 
outside of the original medium of expression.25  Section 102 of the 
Copyright Act provides that copyrights apply to any medium of expression 
that is “now known or later developed,” as long as these works can be 
“perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”26  Thus, the current 
copyright doctrine in the United States would apply an author’s copyright 
protection to his expressions captured in an electronic book, regardless of 
whether that author conceptualized his expressions in a hard copy of the 
book ten years before the advent of electronic books.27 
 
 21. Unless otherwise stated, references to “the Copyright Act” are made to the 
Copyright Act of 1976. 
 22. 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 14.3 (2011). 
 23. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. 4 PATRY, supra note 22, § 14:102. 
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Copyright ownership confers the exclusive rights to reproduce, adapt, 
distribute, publicly perform, and publicly display the works,28 with limited 
exceptions.29 Furthermore, copyright owners have the exclusive statutory 
authority to exercise control over the copying and use of their work for a 
specific period of time, at which point the copyright expires and the work 
enters the public domain.30  Until that time, however, the copyright owners 
can generally determine who may perform their work and financially 
benefit from performing their work.31 
One of these exclusive rights—the right to publicly perform one’s 
work—has become the subject of intense debate as of late, as services like 
those provided by Aereo and AereoKiller spread to users across the United 
States.32  Together, § 106(4) and (5) of the Copyright Act are commonly 
referred to as the “Public Performance” clauses, and § 106(5) is commonly 
referred to as the “Transmit Clause.”33  These subsections provide: 
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and 
to authorizeany of the following: . . . (4) in the case of literary, musical, 
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;        
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, sculptural works, including the 
individual images of motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display 
the copyrighted work publicly.34 
However, the public performance rights and the other exclusive rights are 
subject to limited exceptions, which are delineated in §§ 107 to 118 of the 
Copyright Act.  One such limit is “fair use,” which is commonly raised as a 
defense for failing to first obtain permission from a copyright holder when a 
person uses copyrighted material for educational activities, literary and 
social criticism, parody, and other activities protected by the First 
Amendment.35  Other limitations on a copyright holder’s exclusive rights 
include:  reproduction of one copy of a copyrighted work for libraries or 
archives,36 transfer of a lawful copy of a work by the owner of that copy,37 
secondary transmissions,38 ephemeral recordings,39 copies or adaptations of 
 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 106.  For purposes of this Comment, unless otherwise stated, the term 
“exclusive rights” will refer to a copyright owner’s rights to (1) reproduction; (2) adaptation; 
(3) distribution to the public; (4) performance in public; and (5) display in public. 
 29. 4 PATRY, supra note 22, § 10.2.  For further information on the limits on exclusive 
rights and relevant case law interpreting these limitations, see Catherine K. Harris, 
Pathfinder to U.S. Copyright Law, 2 PERSP.:  TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 32 (1993). 
 30. See 4 PATRY, supra note 22, § 7.33. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Gesmer, supra note 12. 
 33. On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991). 
 34. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)–(5) (2012). 
 35. See Harris, supra note 29. 
 36. 17 U.S.C. § 108. 
 37. Id. § 109. 
 38. Id. § 111.  Secondary transmissions refer to transmissions made from a primary 
transmission. See 4 PATRY, supra note 22, § 14:69.  An example of a secondary transmission 
is when hotel management relays the signals transmitted by a broadcast station (a primary 
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computer programs,40 and specific types of performances and displays.41  
Unless one of these exceptions applies, a person must first obtain 
permission from the copyright holder to use the original work.  A prima 
facie case for infringement requires that a party establish (1) ownership of a 
valid copyright, and (2) that the defendant violated an exclusive right 
conferred by that ownership.42 
2.   The Constitutional and Copyright Law Framework 
for Analyzing Current Copyright Issues 
This section discusses the constitutional and copyright law framework for 
analyzing current copyright issues.  It describes the purposes and policies 
that have been considered when applying copyright law.  It also notes how 
advances in technology have required amendments to copyright law. 
a.   The Purpose of Copyright Law 
To analyze complex copyright issues, courts have often considered how 
certain interpretations would (or would not) further or frustrate the purposes 
of copyright law.43  Legal scholars and U.S. courts have noted that 
copyright law seeks to “stimulate artistic creativity” to contribute to the 
public good.44  This goal supports long-term benefits and the Framers’ 
original goal for adopting copyright law:  “to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts.”45  A second, and arguably lesser, purpose of 
copyright law is to protect artists and creators of unique works in the short 
 
transmission) to guests staying at the hotel (the secondary transmission). Id.  Secondary 
transmissions are not exempt from copyright liability when the transmissions are made by a 
cable system. Id. 
 39. 17 U.S.C. § 112.  Ephemeral recordings are “temporary copies necessary to facilitate 
the transmission of sound recordings during internet broadcasting.” See Beethoven.com LLC 
v. Librarian of Cong., 394 F.3d 939, 942 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 40. 17 U.S.C. § 117. 
 41. Id. § 110.  This section discusses ten specific circumstances that constitute limits to a 
copyright holder’s exclusive rights:  classroom activities; instructional broadcasting; 
religious services; nonprofit performances of nondramatic literary works and musical works; 
store receivers (limited reception on home-type receivers involving no admission charge); 
performances at state fairs; record store receivers; performances by or for handicapped 
persons; performances by fraternal organization; and performances of nondramatic literary 
and musical works. Id. 
 42. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 
1138, 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 43. See, e.g., id. 
 44. Lisa A. Zakolski, 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 2 (2012) 
(stating that the primary reason for copyright protection is to contribute to the public good 
and to spur artistic creativity); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 
151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 
‘author’s’ creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good.”). 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
2014] CLOUD-BASED PROVIDERS AND COPYRIGHT 1115 
term.46  By granting to authors and inventors the “exclusive Right to their 
respective writings and Discoveries” for a limited period of time, copyright 
law protects those authors and inventors.47  However, as the Supreme Court 
has stated, “copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the 
owner a secondary consideration.”48  Copyright law also is “intended . . . to 
grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors [and] publishers . . . without 
burdensome requirements . . . [and] to afford greater encouragement in the 
production of literary or artistic works of lasting benefit to benefit the 
world.”49  Though an economic benefit results from copyright law, a greater 
benefit is that copyright protection encourages people to continue to act as 
artists and creators by allowing them to personally gain from their labor.50  
As stated by the Court, “copyright law protects authors’ interest as a means 
to an end; protection is not an end in and of itself.”51 
b.   Amendments to Copyright Law 
Stemming from Advances in Technology 
Though the latest definition of “copyright” comes from the Copyright 
Act of 1976, the Framers of the Constitution considered the legal concept of 
copyright.52  Current copyright law is derived from a constitutional grant of 
authority to Congress “to promote the Progress of Sciences and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”53  Although the Framers 
undoubtedly did not contemplate whether copyright infringement occurred 
when someone other than a copyright holder streamed content over the 
internet, they did give Congress the authority to regulate copyright 
protection and perhaps implicitly recognized that situations might arise that 
would require copyright protections to change.54   Since the Copyright 
Clause was first adopted in the eighteenth century,55 Congress has amended 
it several times to account for advances in technology that reached beyond 
 
 46. Frank J. Lukes, The Public Good v. A Monetary Profit:  The News Organizations’ 
Utilization of the Fair Use Doctrine, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 841, 843 
(2012). 
 47. Id. at 843 n.7 (citing 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3.3 (2012)); see 
also Diane L. Kilpatrick-Lee, Criminal Copyright Law:  Preventing a Clear Danger to the 
U.S. Economy or Clearly Preventing the Original Purpose of Copyright Law?, 14 U. BALT. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 87, 93–94 (2005). 
 48. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (citing United States v. Paramount 
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)). 
 49. Id. at 219 (quoting Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)). 
 50. See Kilpatrick-Lee, supra note 47, at 88. 
 51. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement:  An Inquiry 
Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 745 & n.58 (2003) 
(citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 351 (1991)). 
 52. See Lukes, supra note 46, at 842–44 (discussing the adoption of copyright law in the 
United States). 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See generally Harris, supra note 29. 
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the scope of the existing protections.56  For example, the Copyright Act was 
amended to cover new forms of expression—like music recordings—that 
stemmed from the changing technology.57 
B.   An Introduction to Public Performance 
While public performance protections were ultimately expanded to 
consider implications arising from the advent of cable television and music 
websites, the public performance right has changed over time.58  In 1856, 
Congress granted creators a public performance right, and authors of 
“dramatic compositions” were given the sole right “to act, perform, or 
represent their work or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented.”59  
This protection was extended to musical compositions in 1897.60  While 
copyright law continued to develop alongside technology, it often was the 
subject of debate by those who thought it—and the public performance 
right in particular—was not developing quickly enough.61  For example, 
after composers were given a public performance right, they sought a 
judicial remedy against manufacturing companies who began to reproduce 
their sounds and distribute them through piano rolls.62  Unable to account 
for this change in technology, the 1856 Copyright Act was replaced with 
the 1909 Copyright Act, which established a compulsory mechanical 
 
 56. Id. at 7.  Congress first exercised its copyright power by enacting the Copyright Act 
of 1790, which granted authors the exclusive right to publish and vend maps, charts, and 
books for a term of fourteen years with a fourteen-year renewal option. Id.  In 1802, prints 
were afforded copyright protection. Id.  The Copyright Act of 1831 extended the term for 
copyright protection to twenty-eight years with a fourteen-year renewal option, and it also 
added musical compositions to the list of protected materials. Id.  In 1865, the Copyright Act 
was amended to include photographs to the list of protected materials. Id.  Then, Congress 
amended the Copyright Act again in 1909 to extend the renewal period to twenty-eight 
years. Id.  Motion pictures were added to the Copyright Act in 1912, and sound recordings 
were added in 1971. Id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. Id. (quoting Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (supplemental to Act to 
Amend the Several Acts Respecting Copyright)). Prior to 1856, the Copyright Act provided 
protection only against reproduction and redistribution of copyrighted works. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Kurt E. Kruckeberg, Copyright “Band-Aids” and the Future of Reform, 34 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1545, 1546–50 (2011).  For a further discussion on how to interpret the 
public performance doctrine, see National Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. Broadcasting 
Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614, 651 (D.D.C. 1991) (“The term ‘public performance’ was 
meant to be read broadly” and “it would strain logic to conclude that Congress would have 
intended the degree of copyright protection to turn on the mere method by which television 
signals are transmitted to the public.”). 
 62. See Kruckeberg, supra note 61, at 1549.  A piano roll is a music storage medium 
used to operate a player piano, a piano player, or reproducing piano. Id.  A piano roll is a 
continuous roll of paper with perforations punched into it. Id.  The perforations represent 
note control data. Id.  The roll moves over a reading system known as a “tracker bar” and the 
playing cycle for each musical note is triggered when a perforation crosses the bar and is 
read. Id.; see also Timothy A. Cohan, Ghost in the Attic:  The Notice of Intention to Use and 
the Compulsory License in the Digital Era, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 499, 503 (2010); Peter 
Dicola & Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to Copyright Policy, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 173, 191 (2012). 
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license for reproductions of music.63  Such a license allowed piano-roll 
manufacturers to use copyrighted works without obtaining permission from 
the copyright holder but required the manufacturer to pay the copyright 
holder a statutorily determined fee for the use.64  Despite instituting this 
licensing scheme, Congress’s power was limited by constant innovation and 
an inability to keep up with technology.65  Thus, the judiciary was forced to 
step in to address unanticipated situations.66 
One such instance occurred when the Court interpreted the 1909 
Copyright Act’s provision of an exclusive right to publicly perform a 
musical composition.67  Noting that “the art of radio broadcasting was 
unknown at the time the Copyright Act of 1909 was passed,” the Supreme 
Court was called upon to consider whether a hotel proprietor broadcasting a 
radio signal over loudspeakers to public rooms constituted a public 
performance.68  In its analysis, the Court looked to whether the hotel guests 
received the underlying copyrighted work—the song—in a public place.69  
The hotel proprietor argued that he was not engaging in a “performance,” as 
he urged that the “performance” at issue was the original transmission from 
the radio station, but the Court did not find this argument persuasive.70  
Rather than looking to the specific transmissions of copyrighted content, the 
Court found the public’s access to the underlying work, made possible by 
the hotel, was sufficient to constitute copyright infringement.71 
While the Court was able to interpret the 1909 Copyright Act to protect 
copyright holders from unanticipated technological developments, the law 
simply could not be expanded to cover every innovative way to share 
copyrighted content.  In the 1960s, fifty years before systems like Aereo 
threatened the success of cable providers, the growth of cable television 
systems raised new copyright concerns specifically for content providers 
who maintained the exclusive rights to certain programs.72  While most 
U.S. households received locally broadcasted programming—which did not 
threaten these content providers—more remote and mountainous 
communities could not receive the same signals because of their geographic 
locations.73  Cable systems provided a solution:  by receiving the broadcast 
 
 63. See Kruckeberg, supra note 61, at 1546. 
 64. Id. at 1549–50. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. at 1550 (discussing how the judiciary had to apply the 1909 Copyright Act 
because the legislature could not anticipate not-yet invented technologies).  For instance, 
because the development of the “word roll,” a piano roll with lyrics printed next to the roll’s 
perforations, was unanticipated by the negotiators of the 1909 Act, the judiciary had to 
determine whether the inclusion of lyrics on a piano roll constituted infringement of the 
lyricist’s copyright under the language of the 1909 Act. Id. 
 67. Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 195–97 (1931). 
 68. Id. at 196. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 196–97. 
 71. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 
1138, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing Buck, 283 U.S. at 196). 
 72. See Vivian I. Kim, The Public Performance Right in the Digital Age:  Cartoon 
Network LP v. CSC Holdings, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 263 (2009). 
 73. See WPIX, Inc. v. IvI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 281 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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signals and retransmitting them via coaxial cables, the cable companies 
provided their subscribers with that otherwise unseen locally broadcast 
programming.74  Over time and with increased technology, cable companies 
were able to deliver both distant and local broadcasting channels.75  To 
observe the transmitted content, subscribers would simply tune their 
televisions to certain frequencies allocated to each channel. 
After copyright holders asserted their exclusionary rights against cable 
operators in two separate suits, Congress revised the 1909 Copyright Act in 
1976.76  In the 1976 amendments, Congress gave rights against cable 
operators to copyright holders when cable operators retransmitted a 
broadcast to the public.77  The 1976 revision to the Copyright Act 
contemplates these retransmissions in the public performance clauses.78 
Like the earlier versions of the Copyright Act, the Copyright Act of 
1976—the current framework for copyright law in the United States—was a 
response to changing technology.79  However, the Copyright Act of 1976 
has been criticized for being too narrow instead of a “simple, broad, and 
flexible provision” that might “stand the test of time.”80  Its failure to define 
 
 74. See id. 
 75. See Darlene A. Cole, Chipping Away at the Copyright Owner’s Rights:  Congress’ 
Continued Reliance On the Compulsory License, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219, 228 (1994). 
 76. See Kim, supra note 72, at 277.  In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 
Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968), owners of copyrights in motion pictures alleged that Fortnightly, 
the owner of community antenna television (CATV) systems, violated their exclusive right 
of public performance. Id. at 393.  Fortnightly’s CATV systems retransmitted signals from 
television stations that had obtained licenses for certain copyrighted movies. Id.   Fortnightly 
did not, however, obtain licenses with the copyright owners and some of the licenses held by 
the stations expressly prohibited CATV systems from broadcasting their content. Id. at 396–
97.  The Supreme Court drew a distinction between the broadcasters that actively performed 
a service and the passive viewers who were “passive beneficiaries.” Id. at 395–402.  
Comparing Fortnightly to passive viewers, the Court held that the defendant was not liable 
under the 1909 Copyright Act because CATV systems merely carried unedited programming 
chosen by the broadcasters; they did not “perform” the retransmission of the content. Id. at 
401–02.  Six years later, when copyright holders of television programs brought suit against 
CATV systems for intercepting broadcast transmissions and retransmitting them, the Court 
found for the defendant cable operator again. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. 
Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 408 (1974).  The Court held that the retransmission of signals did 
not violate a content provider’s copyright, as the importation of distant signals from one 
place to another did not constitute a performance under the 1909 Act. Id. 
 77. Kim, supra note 72, at 277. 
 78. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 79. See Kruckeberg, supra note 61, at 1546–60. 
 80. See id. at 1551–53.  In discussing the Copyright Act’s inability to account for 
undeveloped technology, Kruckeberg discusses the concept of public performance protection 
as it applies to music, and how the definition of “public performance” has led to inconsistent 
treatment for seemingly similar activities. Id.  He explains that, before the Digital 
Performance Act of 1995 (DPA), sound recordings were not extended public performance 
protection. Id.  Before the DPA, public performance rights were reserved only in the musical 
composition underlying the recording. Id.  The DPA extended sole rights for public 
performance “by means of a digital audio transmission” to copyright holders of sound 
recordings. Id.  Thus, while web-based radio services providing digital audio transmission 
had to license the use of songs from both copyright holders of the sound recording and the 
copyright holder of the musical composition, regular radio broadcasters needed only to 
license use from the copyright holder of the musical composition. Id. 
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important statutory language has also led to further criticism because it left 
key terms ambiguous.81  For instance, the 1976 Copyright Act does not 
define “public” for purposes of the public performance clause.82  To 
interpret the public performance clauses, courts have turned to the 
legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act to support their 
interpretations.83 
When companies do transmit a copyrighted work to the public, they are 
required to obtain a license before doing so.84  In the case of television, 
cable companies that retransmit broadcast television pay licensing fees to 
the broadcasters.85  This compulsory licensing scheme, which requires 
cable television systems to obtain a license (rather than express permission 
of the owners) before retransmitting programming embodied in broadcast 
signals, was adopted to account for cable operators’ use of copyrighted 
works and their retransmissions.86  When cable television began to grow in 
the 1950s, broadcasters viewed cable systems with apparent favor, as the 
cable systems allowed viewers to receive otherwise unavailable signals, and 
an increased viewership lead to increased revenue from advertising.87  
Copyright owners reacted similarly, as the license fee that copyright owners 
received from stations also considered the viewer market statistics and 
advertising income, which contributed to increased license fees being paid 
to copyright owners.88  However, copyright owners ultimately became 
dissatisfied when cable operators began to import distant signals containing 
local, non-network program for two reasons.89  First, the advertisers 
supporting these new, distant programs were not interested in advertising on 
non-local markets, and thus they were not spending money that would go 
directly to copyright owners as it once had.90  Second, larger cable 
operators who could import signals from a distance threatened the success 
of local broadcasters, the content of which was undesired on the national 
market.91   As cable viewership increased, it came at the expense of local 
 
 81. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 
1138, 1143–44 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64–65 (1976). 
 84. See BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1143–44. 
 85. See id. at 1140 (discussing licensing fees). 
 86. Fred H. Cate, Cable Television and the Compulsory Copyright License, 42 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 191 (1990); see also Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 
U.S. 390, 400 (1968); David E. Leibowitz, The Sequential Distribution of Television 
Programming in a Dynamic Marketplace, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 671, 680 (1985) (discussing 
that the compulsory licensing scheme’s adoption came after the Supreme Court examined 
the copyright liability of cable operators under the 1909 Copyright Act and held that passive 
retransmission of copyrighted content did not constitute an infringement under the 1909 Act 
in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists). 
 87. See Cate, supra note 86, at 193. See generally H. SHOOSHAN, C. JACKSON, S. BESEN 
& J. WILSON, CABLE, COPYRIGHT, AND CONSUMER WELFARE:  THE HIDDEN COST OF THE 
COMPULSORY LICENSE (1981). 
 88. See Cate, supra note 86, at 193. 
 89. Id. at 194–95. 
 90. Id. at 194. 
 91. Id. at 195. 
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broadcasts because copyright owners themselves (1) lost income from local 
broadcast companies that were either flailing or out of business, and (2) 
suffered from the uncompensated use of their copyrighted works by a wider 
audience.92 
Concluding that it would be impractical and burdensome to require every 
cable system to negotiate separately with every copyright owner whose 
work was being publicly performed through retransmission by a cable 
system, Congress established the compulsory licensing scheme to address 
broadcasters’ and copyright owners’ concerns.93  The compulsory licensing 
scheme allows the copyright owner to license the use of her rights against 
payment set by law or by negotiation,94 and addresses “public 
performances.”95  Under a compulsory license, cable operators must submit 
Statements of Account and Royalties to the U.S. Copyright Office twice 
every year.96  The Copyright Office then examines the statements, deducts 
operating costs, and deposits the balance in the U.S. Treasury for 
distribution to the copyright owners.97  Royalty rates are set by the 
Copyright Royalty Tribunal.98 
 
 92. Id. 193, 195 (discussing a study that observed that copyright owners resorted to 
regaining control of their product by withdrawing their programs from over-the-air broadcast 
stations in order to prevent cable providers from carrying them, and even paid cable systems 
not to carry their programs); Leslie A. Swackhamer, Cable-Copyright:  The Corruption of 
Consensus, 6 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 283, 288 (1983). 
 93. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976); see also Cole, supra note 75, at 235 
(discussing Congress’s decision to pass the Satellite Home Viewer Act to address the 
retransmissions made by satellite carriers and to create a compulsory license for the 
transmissions by these carriers for private viewing by owners of satellite dishes). 
 94. John Eggerton, Padden:  Get Rid of Compulsory License and Retrans, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE MOBILE (July 20, 2012), 
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/padden-get-rid-compulsory-license-
and-retras/60412. 
 95. 17 U.S.C. § 111(b)–(c) (2012).  The act provides that “the secondary transmission to 
the public of a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary transmission is 
actionable as an act of infringement under section 501, and is fully subject to the remedies 
provided by sections 502 through 506, if the primary transmission is not made for reception 
by the public at large but is controlled and limited to reception by particular members of the 
public.” Id. § 111(b).  For more information on the fees paid, see id. § 111(d).  In addition to 
this compulsory license scheme, Congress created (or retained) other compulsory licenses:  
the statutory mechanical royalty, the jukebox royalty, and the educational broadcasting 
royalty. See generally Frederick F. Greenman, Jr. & Alvin Deutsch, The Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal and the Statutory Mechanical Royalty:  History and Prospect, 1 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 1 (1982). 
 96. See Leibowitz, supra note 86, at 681–82. 
 97. Id.  Royalties generally are calculated on the basis of cable carriage of distant non-
network programming, although the secondary transmission of all broadcast signals is 
subject to compulsory licensing. Id. at 682.  As Leibowitz explains: 
In assessing liability under the compulsory licensing system, Congress determined 
that copyright owners of broadcast programming, retransmitted by cable within the 
station’s local service area, did not threaten economically the copyright owner.  
Similarly, Congress noted that copyright owners of programming distributed by 
national television networks are paid on the basis of nationwide coverage and, 
therefore, are not injured by cable retransmission. 
Id. 
 98. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b). 
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C.   An Introduction to Current Technology and the Recent Battles 
Between Technological Innovators and Copyright Holders 
As improvements in cable television challenged the grasp of the 
Copyright Act prior to the amendments in 1976, evolving technology does 
the same to the current Copyright Act.  The following section provides an 
overview of specific technological systems that have been used by cable 
operators and content streamers and introduces lawsuits alleging that the 
systems violate the Transmit Clause of the Copyright Act. 
1.   Cablevision and the RS-DVR System 
In 2008, Cartoon Network, the owner of copyrights in various movies 
and television programs, brought a suit for declaratory judgment that 
Cablevision, a cable operator, infringed its copyrights through the use of a 
remote storage digital video recorder (RS-DVR) system.99  The Second 
Circuit in Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 
(Cablevision)100 held that Cablevision’s proposed RS-DVR system would 
not directly infringe the copyrights in broadcast programs as the 
transmissions were not made “to the public.”101 
In so holding, the Cablevision court looked specifically to the nature of 
the novel RS-DVR system, which allowed individual Cablevision 
customers to record cable programming and receive playback through “the 
cloud.”102  While a typical digital video recorder (DVR) stores recorded 
programming on an internal hard drive rather than on a cassette, the RS-
DVR allows users who do not have a stand-alone DVR to record cable 
programming on central hard drives housed and maintained by Cablevision 
at a remote location.103  Customers may receive playback of those programs 
through their home television sets, using their standard cable box equipped 
with RS-DVR software.104 
Cablevision aggregates television programming from content providers, 
the various broadcast and cable channels that produce or provide individual 
programs and then transmits those programs into subscribers’ homes 
through a coaxial cable.105  Cablevision gathers the contents of various 
channels into a single stream of data, processes this stream, and transmits 
the data to its customers in real time.106 
In essence, if 1000 Cablevision customers recorded Game Seven of the 
World Series, Cablevision would create 1000 copies—one for each 
 
 99. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121, 123 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
 100. 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 101. Id. at 139.  The Second Circuit also ruled on fixation and volition issues, which are 
not addressed in this Comment. 
 102. Id. at 124. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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customer.107  If a customer wanted to rewatch the program or rewind it, 
Cablevision would transit the specific copy created for that customer and no 
one else could access that particular copy, thus making each copy 
“individual.”108 
2.   Aereo I, BarryDriller, and the Streaming Technology 
In American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,109 the 
Southern District of New York denied the request of broadcasters and 
content owners to issue a preliminary injunction requiring Aereo, a cloud-
based service provider,110 to stop streaming copyrighted content to its 
subscribers.111  Relying on Cablevision’s reasoning, the court held that a 
single copy–based transmission used by Aereo to one of its subscribers was 
not a public performance, despite the ability for many viewers to see the 
same underlying work through the Aereo system.112  The holding was 
affirmed by the Second Circuit in WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc.113 
(collectively with the Southern District’s holding, “Aereo I”). 
Faced with a similar set of facts in December 2012, the Central District 
of California in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content 
Systems PLC114 granted a preliminary injunction ordering AereoKiller, a 
Los Angeles–based cloud service provider that allowed subscribers to view 
television in real time over the internet, to shut down its services.115  The 
court held that AereoKiller’s transmission of the content likely was an 
infringement on the plaintiff’s public performance right.116 
 
 107. See Gesmer, supra note 12, at 3. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 110. Cloud service providers offer services that allow data to be stored on the internet in a 
figurative “cloud” instead of on a person’s computer or mobile device. See William Jeremy 
Robison, Free at What Cost?:  Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored Communications 
Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195 (2010).  The U.S. Department of Commerce National Institute of 
Standards and Technology defines “cloud computing” as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources 
(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned 
and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” PETER MELL 
& TIMOTHY GRANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PUB. NO. 800-145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF 
CLOUD COMPUTING:  RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND 
TECHNOLOGIES (2011).  The cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics:  on-
demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured 
service. See id. at 2. 
 111. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see 
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013) (collectively with the 
Southern District’s holding, “Aereo I”); see also Daniel L. Brenner & Stephen H. Kay, ABC 
v. Aereo, Inc.:  When Is Internet Distribution a “Public Performance” Under Copyright 
Law, 24 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 12 (2012). 
 112. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377. 
 113. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d 676. 
 114. 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 115. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 
1138, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 116. Id. 
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Despite reaching opposite conclusions, the Aereo I and BarryDriller 
courts, like the Cablevision court, started their analyses the same way:  they 
looked to the specific technology being used to stream content.117  The 
systems used by Aereo and AereoKiller allowed users to access “free,” 
over-the-air broadcast television on any internet-connected device, like a 
computer, laptop, or smartphone.118  As Aereo and AereoKiller allowed 
their users to access programming over the internet rather than through a 
cable connection, a separate cable subscription was not needed.119  After 
logging into their accounts, Aereo and AereoKiller subscribers could 
choose to either watch or record a program from a list of programs currently 
being aired or that would be aired at a later time.120  Users could also elect 
to record a program currently being broadcast on cable or scheduled to be 
broadcast later and could watch it at any point once the recording process 
started.121 
Upon receiving a user’s request, Aereo and AereoKiller sent a unique 
transmission to that user after the request was processed by its complex 
antenna system and stored briefly in user-specific directories.122  Even if 
 
 117. See Gesmer, supra note 12, at 2. 
 118. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 378.  Subscribers pay a fee to use Aereo. See 
supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 119. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 378. 
 120. Id.; see also Gesmer, supra note 12, at 2–3. 
 121. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 378. 
 122. Id.  When a user decides to “watch” a show from Aereo or AereoKiller, the web 
browser sends a request to Aereo’s application server, which then sends a request and 
information about the user and the requested television program to Aereo’s antenna server. 
Id.  The antenna server allocates resources to the user, depending on whether the user is a 
“static” or a “dynamic” subscriber. Id.  Static users have a set of previously selected 
antennas assigned to them, while dynamic users are randomly assigned an antenna each time 
they use the Aereo system. Id.  Although one user may use a previously used antenna, no 
two users share a single antenna at the same time. Id.  Moreover, the data obtained by a 
particular antenna while allocated to a particular user is not “shared” with or accessible by 
any other Aereo user. Id.  Once resources are allocated to the requesting user, the antenna 
server sends a “tune” request that directs the user’s antenna to “tune into” a particular 
frequency band to access the desired program. Id.  The antenna server also sends a request to 
the streaming server that creates a unique directory, assigned to the user, for storing the data 
received by the antennas and processed by the assigned transcoder. Id.  Upon the creation of 
the directory, an electrical signal is sent from the antenna, processed and converted into data 
packets, and then sent to the transcoder, which encodes it in a form to be transmitted over the 
internet. Id.  The data is then sent to the streaming server, where it is saved on a hard disk to 
a file in the previously created directory and, once saved, is read from that file into a “RAM 
memory buffer,” which sends the data to the user over the internet once a sufficient amount 
of data has accumulated. Id.  As additional data is received from the antenna, that data 
continues to be saved to the hard disk and then read into the RAM memory buffer to be 
transmitted to the user. Id.  The RAM memory buffer contains only a small amount of data 
that is continuously replaced as it is sent to the user and new packets of data are fed into the 
buffer. Id.  For the most part, the same process occurs when the user elects to “record” 
instead of “watch.”  When users choose the “record” function, however, the file saved to the 
hard disk is tagged as permanent and automatically retained. Id.  Each of Aereo’s antennas 
consists of a pair of metal loops; eighty antennas are packed on one end of a circuit board, 
with a metal rail that separates the area with the antenna elements from an area housing the 
electronic components used to operate the antennas and send the signals. Id.  These circuit 
boards are stored parallel to one another. Id.  The metal rail fits closely together with these 
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two users selected the same program to watch or record at the same time, 
each user’s request would be processed by a different antenna, stored in a 
different directory, and transmitted separately.123  For instance, if 1000 
Aereo customers wanted to watch Game Seven of the World Series as it is 
broadcast on FOX, the Aereo subscribers would need to “watch” the 
program via its website.124  Aereo’s antenna system would receive the 
requests, data would be stored for several seconds on Aereo’s servers, and 
then the data would be transmitted to subscribers.125  If another 1000 
subscribers chose to “record” the program, then 1000 other antennas would 
receive a signal, store data on Aereo’s servers in 1000 separate directories, 
and be available for each subscriber’s request later.126  Aereo would 
transmit the specific copy recorded for each customer, and no one would 
receive a transmission of the same copy.127  As the systems used by Aereo 
and AereoKiller are materially the same, AereoKiller would undergo the 
same process to transmit Game Seven of the World Series to its 
customers.128 
a.   The Aereo I Court’s Decision 
About four years after Cablevision, copyright holders brought suit 
alleging that Aereo, a provider of live internet broadcasts, publicly 
performed their copyrighted content.129  Aereo’s system, as discussed in 
Part I, allowed a user to watch broadcast television through any internet-
connected device by logging into her Aereo account and selecting a desired 
program to watch or record.130  Aereo suggested that its system is very 
similar to the RS-DVR system discussed in Cablevision from a user’s 
perspective:  users of both the RS-DVR system and Aereo’s services may 
access programming that has been previously broadcasted.131  When users 
choose to “watch” or “record” certain programs, Aereo’s web browser 
sends a request to Aereo’s antenna server, which then allocates an antenna 
and transcoder to the user, and then sends a “tune” request that directs the 
user’s antenna to “tune into” a particular broadcast frequency to obtain the 
desired program.132  Like the RS-DVR system, Aereo’s system sends a 
unique signal to its user who elects to “watch” a program, and the system 
stores the data to be accessed only by the individual user who elects to 
 
boards to form a barrier between the antennas and other electronic elements of Aereo’s 
system. Id. 
 123. See Gesmer, supra note 12, at 5. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 130. Id. at 377. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 378. 
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“record” a program.133  Either way, the individual subscriber making the 
request is the only recipient of the data and signal sent.134 
Due to the similarities between the RS-DVR system contemplated by 
Cablevision and the services provided by Aereo, both of which allowed 
users to access previously recorded programming, the Aereo I court found 
itself bound by Cablevision’s reasoning.  Specifically, the Aereo I court 
employed the following analysis, as endorsed by Cablevision:  (1) the 
Transmit Clause directs courts to consider the potential audience of the 
individual transmission, including whether there is a limit to the potential 
audience capable of receiving the transmission, and (2) generally, private 
transmissions, or transmissions not capable of being received by the public, 
should not be aggregated when conducting a public performance 
analysis.135 
In evaluating the potential audience of the transmissions by the Aereo 
systems, the Aereo I court analogized the Aereo system to Cablevision’s 
RS-DVR system.  In the first part of its analysis, the court concluded that 
Aereo’s system and Cablevision’s RS-DVR system were “materially 
identical” for three reasons.136  First, Aereo’s system created a distinct copy 
of each program requested by a subscriber and saved it to a directory on 
Aereo’s hard disks that was assigned to a specific user.137  Second, after the 
user requested this programming, Aereo transmitted unique signals, which 
ultimately translate into a unique copy to be viewed by the requesting 
user.138  Third, the transmission was sent only to the requesting user and no 
other subscriber could access the copy.139  The Cablevision court had 
concluded that the RS-DVR transmissions were not made “to the public” 
because the system created unique copies and transmitted the unique copies 
to the particular Cablevision customer.  Similarly, the Aereo court also 
relied on the uniqueness of each copy and the subsequent unique 
transmission to the requesting subscriber to conclude that its transmission 
was made to specific individuals.  Accordingly, the court held that Aereo’s 
transmissions were not made “to the public.”140 
In the second part of its analysis, the Aereo I court focused on another 
point employed by the Cablevision court:  that Aereo’s system, like 
Cablevision’s, allowed its subscribers to do what otherwise could be 
accomplished using a VCR or standard DVR system.141  From the users’ 
perspective, Aereo’s system merely allowed them to do the same thing that 
 
 133. Id. at 377. For a fuller discussion of the technology in use by Aereo, see supra Part 
I.C.2. 
 134. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp 2d at 377. 
 135. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 689 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 136. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp 2d at 386. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 690. 
 141. Id.  The Cablevision court noted that “[t]o the customer, however, the processes of 
recording and playback on the RS-DVR are similar to that of a standard set-top DVR.” 
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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they could do with a DVR or Slingbox—access free over-the-air broadcasts 
on an internet-connected device.142  As the Cablevision court stressed that 
the RS-DVR system accomplished the same end as did other, non-
infringing systems that did not transmit “to the public,” the Aereo I court 
similarly noted that Aereo’s system mirrored a non-infringing Slingbox or 
DVR.143 
Next, the court looked to the nature of the transmission itself and 
concluded that the transmissions should not be aggregated in determining 
whether a public performance had occurred.144  Relying on Cablevision, the 
court noted that a public performance did not occur simply because a 
number of people—every Aereo subscriber or perhaps even “the public”—
may have been able to watch the same television program.145  The 
Cablevision court stressed that the appropriate inquiry for a Transmit 
Clause analysis is the potential audience of the particular transmission in 
question, not the potential audience of the underlying work or the 
performance.146  Though the copyright holders offered a related 
argument—that the court should look to how Aereo’s transmissions 
originate from the original broadcast signal rather than Aereo-created 
signals to find that Aereo made a public performance—the court rejected 
this reasoning.  Instead, the court concluded that the argument was merely 
another way of stating that the public’s ability to watch the show was 
dispositive of the transmission being made to the public.147 
The Second Circuit also noted that it was bound by Cablevision’s 
decision not to aggregate the transmissions made by the content providers 
and those made by Cablevision.148  The district court in Aereo distinguished 
between the systems of Cablevision and Aereo, noting that Aereo made 
copies of programs through separate streams of data.149  By contrast, the 
RS-DVR system in Cablevision used a single stream of data to create 
multiple copies.150  Because the Cablevision court refused to accept the 
copyright holder’s argument that Cablevision publicly performed a work 
when it split and retransmitted the incoming program stream, the Aereo I 
court applied the same logic to conclude that Aereo’s system also did not 
publicly perform in violation of § 106(4).  In so holding, the district court 
stressed that Aereo’s case was more compelling than Cablevision’s:  if 
Cablevision was permitted to create signals from the same data source 
without infringing on the copyright holders’ public performance rights, then 
 
 142. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 682; Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 375. 
 143. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 386–87. 
 144. Id. at 387. 
 145. Id. 
 146. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 691. 
 147. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 386–87. 
 148. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 695. 
 149. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 387. 
 150. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
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surely Aereo’s system of creating signals from different data sources also 
would not infringe on those rights either.151 
b.   The BarryDriller Court’s Decision 
In December 2012, a federal judge in California granted a preliminary 
injunction ordering AereoKiller, a Los Angeles–based cloud service 
provider that allowed subscribers to view television in real time over the 
internet, to shut down its services.152  Under essentially the same facts 
contemplated by the Cablevision and Aereo I courts, the court in Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Systems, PLC held that 
AereoKiller’s transmission of the content was likely an infringement of the 
plaintiff’s public performance right.153 In its analysis, the BarryDriller 
court expressly rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning, as established in 
Cablevision and subsequently employed in Aereo I, for the following 
reasons:  (1) the statutory language of the Transmit Clause was subject to 
multiple interpretations; (2) binding Ninth Circuit precedent conflicted with 
Second Circuit precedent; and (3) arguments relied on by Cablevision and 
Aereo had been rejected by Congress when it amended the Copyright Act in 
1976.154 
Like the Cablevision and Aereo courts, the BarryDriller court started its 
analysis by examining the statutory language in the Transmit Clause. 155  It 
looked to Cablevision’s holding, noting that the Second Circuit “reasoned 
that unless the transmission itself is public, the transmitter has not infringed 
the public performance right.”156  However, the BarryDriller court noted 
that Cablevision’s interpretation of the Transmit Clause “[was] not the only 
possible reading of the statute” and that the statutory language itself does 
not require that a public performance be received from the same 
transmission.157  Rather, the BarryDriller court noted that the statute was 
concerned with the performance of the copyrighted work, regardless of the 
copy from which the transmission of the work was made: 
The statute provides that the right to transmit is exclusive “whether the 
members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display 
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at 
different times.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.  Again, the concern is with the 
performance of the copyrighted work, irrespective of which copy of the 
work the transmission is made from.  Very few people gather around their 
oscilloscopes to admire the sinusoidal waves of a television broadcast 
transmission.  People are interested in watching the performance of the 
 
 151. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 382. 
 152. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 
1138, 1150–51 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 153. Id. at 1141–44. See generally Gesmer, supra note 12. 
 154. BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1146 (“Defendants’ unique-cony transmission 
argument based on Cablevision and Aereo is not binding in the Ninth Circuit.”). 
 155. Id. at 1143. 
 156. Id. at 1144 (emphasis added). 
 157. Id. at 1145 (“Thus, Cablevision’s focus on the uniqueness of the individual copy 
from which a transmission is made is not commanded by the statute.”). 
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work.  And it is the public  performance of the copyrighted work with 
which the Copyright Act, by its express language, is concerned.  Thus, 
Cablevision’s focus on the uniqueness of the individual copy from which 
a transmission is made is not commanded by the statute.158 
In noting that Cablevision’s core argument—the “unique copy 
transmission argument” based on its interpretation of the statute—was 
unsupported by the Copyright Act, the BarryDriller court called into 
question the case law relied on by Cablevision and Aereo.159 
Lastly, the BarryDriller court dismissed another argument expressed in 
Cablevision and Aereo, reasoning that Congress already had rejected it.  In 
Cablevision, the court noted that the RS-DVR system merely provided a 
service equivalent to what individuals could lawfully do themselves with a 
VCR or a standard DVR.160  However, the court in BarryDriller noted that 
Congress had rejected this mode of reasoning, as evidenced by its 
amendments to the Copyright Act after previously endorsing the idea that a 
commercial provider was not infringing on an exclusive right if an 
individual could lawfully do the same act.161  The BarryDriller court noted 
that Congress acted in response to Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, Inc.,162 which held that the use of antenna systems by cable 
companies to broadcast content did not constitute a public performance 
because the action would not be a public performance if an individual 
erected an antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house, and installed 
amplifying equipment.163  Noting that “cable systems are commercial 
enterprises whose basic retransmission operations are based on the carriage 
of copyrighted program material and . . . copyright royalties should be paid 
by cable operators to the creators of such programs,” Congress amended the 
Copyright Act to require cable companies to pay license fees to access 
locally broadcasted content, despite the fact that individuals could access 
 
 158. Id. at 1144–45 (noting that, “like Cablevision and this case, [the Supreme Court] was 
concerned with a copyright in the work that was broadcast.”)  The court also noted that, in 
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 196 (1931), a case upon which Cablevision 
relied, “[t]he Supreme Court was not concerned about the ‘performance of the 
performance’—instead, it held that using a radio to perform the copyrighted song infringed 
the exclusive right to perform the song (not to perform the performance of the song).” 
BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1144. 
 159. Id. at 1145; see also WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 690 (2d Cir. 
2013) (Chin, J., dissenting).  In his dissent, Judge Chin noted that Cablevision’s holding that 
Cablevision’s transmissions were not public “makes no sense.” Id. at 697.  He explained 
that, under the theory endorsed by Cablevision and Aereo, Aereo could retransmit the Super 
Bowl “live” to 50,000 subscribers and yet, merely because Aereo assigned individual 
antennas to each subscriber and transmitted a unique recorded copy of the broadcast, Aereo 
actually made 50,000 private, non-infringing performances. Id. at 697.  However, as Judge 
Chin stated:  “These are very much public performances.” Id.; see also WPIX, Inc. v. IvI, 
Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 283 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing how the public would be affected by 
changes in the television industry stemming from a convoluted interpretation of the Transmit 
Clause). 
 160. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 691. 
 161. BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1146. 
 162. 392 U.S. 390, 400 (1968).  For a further discussion of Fortnightly, see supra note 76 
and accompanying text. 
 163. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 400. 
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the same content by using their own antenna.164  AereoKiller subscribers 
could also access broadcasted content if they were to use a personal antenna 
system instead of their AereoKiller subscription, but the BarryDriller court 
rejected this contention based on Congress’s desire to ban “commercial 
enterprises” from conducting activities that could legally be done by 
individuals.165 
c.   The Aereo II Court’s Decision 
On June 25, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a ruling against Aereo in 
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), finding 
that its individual transmissions to individual users constituted a public 
performance for purposes of copyright infringement.166  In its reasoning, 
the majority focused primarily on the congressional intent behind the 
passing of the Copyright Act of 1976.167  Accordingly, it likened Aereo’s 
services to those of the cable companies that the amendments to the 
Copyright Act sought to address.168  Neither the majority nor dissent 
addressed whether Aereo would actually qualify as a cable system under the 
statute, however, which left unclear whether Aereo could qualify to pay for 
§ 111’s compulsory license.169 
II.   THE SOLUTION POSES ANOTHER PROBLEM: 
THE AEREO II COURT’S DECISION 
As stated in Part I, the public performance doctrine came under intense 
scrutiny due to the streaming activities of Aereo170 and AereoKiller.171  Part 
II of this Comment discusses the majority’s analysis and the dissent in 
Aereo II, particularly focusing on the Court’s decision not to address 
whether Aereo qualifies as a cable company. 
 
 164. BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1146 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 88–89 
(1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see Zomba Enter., Inc. v. Panorama Records, 
Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 582–83 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a commercial karaoke CD producer 
could not “stand in the shoes” of its customers or benefit from their customers’ “fair use” 
arguments); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 88–89 (1976). 
 165. See BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1146; see also WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 
696.  Judge Chin categorized Congress’s amendments in the 1976 Copyright Act as a 
response by Congress “to reach new technologies like this one that are designed solely to 
exploit someone else’s copyrighted work,” and therefore applied the Transmit Clause in a 
way that barred Aereo from an activity he deemed to be exploiting a copyrighted work in the 
same way that cable broadcasters exploited local broadcasters prior to the 1976 Copyright 
Act. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 699. 
 166. 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014) (Aereo II). 
 167. Id. at 2509. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See generally WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d 676 (majority opinion); Am. Broad. Cos., 
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 171. See generally Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 
F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
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A.   The Majority Opinion in Aereo II 
In determining whether Aereo infringed copyright holders’ right to 
“perform” their copyrighted works “publicly,” the Court considered first 
whether Aereo performed at all merely by supplying equipment and content 
to subscribers.172  In holding that Aereo performed, the Court considered:  
(1) the language adopted by the 1976 Copyright Act; (2) Congress’s 
purposes in amending the Copyright Act in 1976 and adding the Transmit 
Clause, and (3) Aereo’s likeness to cable companies targeted by these 
amendments. 
The Court first looked to the language of §§ 106(4) and 101 to determine 
whether Aereo transmits a performance when a subscriber watches a 
program using an Aereo system.173  Noting that “[t]o perform . . . a work 
‘publicly means . . . to transmit . . . a performance . . . of the work . . . to the 
public . . . ,” the Court found that the language did not clearly state when an 
entity performs or whether it performs merely by providing equipment and 
allowing others to select the content that this equipment transmits.174  As a 
result, the Court declined to conclude whether Aereo’s equipment merely 
responded to subscriber requests or whether it affirmatively performed in a 
way that would violate the statute.175 
Next, the Court looked to Congress’s reasoning for adopting the 1976 
amendments to the Copyright Act.  As other courts did in their analyses,176 
the Court noted that Congress responded to the Court’s decisions in 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc.,177 in which the Court held that community antenna television (CATV) 
providers did not “perform” in violation of the then-current statute.178  
Reasoning that CATV systems simply carried whatever programs they 
received, unlike broadcasters that chose the content to transmit, the 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter Courts saw the CATV providers as viewers 
rather than performers.179 
The Aereo II Court noted that Congress amended the Copyright Act 
largely to reject the Court’s holdings in Fortnightly and Teleprompter, and 
perhaps specifically to address the lines drawn by the Court between the 
viewer and the performer.180  The amended statute provides that to 
“perform” an audiovisual work means “to show its images in any sequence 
or to make the sounds accompanying it audible,” thus suggesting that both 
the viewer and the broadcaster of a television program perform.181  The 
Court supported its stance with legislative history:  “[A] broadcasting 
network is performing when it transmits [a singer’s performance of a song] 
 
 172. Aereo II, 134 S. Ct. at 2503. 
 173. Id. at 2504. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 177. 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
 178. Aereo II, 134 S. Ct. at 2505. 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. at 2505–06. 
 181. Id. 
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. . . and any individual is performing whenever he or she . . . communicates 
the performance by turning on a receiving set.”182  The Court then looked to 
the Transmit Clause, noting that Congress intended the language to cover 
cable system activities like those of the CATV systems in Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter.183 
Before ending its “performance” analysis, the Court likened Aereo to the 
CATV companies that Congress amended the Copyright Act to reach.184  
Reasoning that Aereo “sells a service that allows subscribers to watch 
television programs,” and, much like the CATV providers in Fortnightly 
and Teleprompter, allows its users to select the content to watch, it 
effectively performed like a cable company.185 
After determining that Aereo performed, the Court considered what 
Aereo performed and whether it did so publicly.  In holding that Aereo 
transmitted content to the public, the Court again looked to the language of 
the Transmit Clause and buttressed its reading with legislative history and 
Aereo’s likeness to cable companies. 
To determine what performance Aereo transmitted, the Court looked to 
§ 101’s language.  The Court noted that, under the Act, “[t]o ‘transmit’ a 
performance . . . is to communicate it by any device or process whereby 
images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent,” 
and to perform an audiovisual work means “to show its images in any 
sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.”186  Accepting 
Aereo’s contention that it transmitted a new performance of a work instead 
of retransmitting the prior underlying broadcast, the Court nevertheless 
concluded that Aereo transmits a performance whenever one of its 
subscribers watches a program.187 
Moreover, though it noted that Aereo’s technology did separate it from 
traditional cable companies to a degree, the similarities were sufficient to 
overcome crafty technological contrivances:  “We do not see how this 
single difference, invisible to subscriber and broadcaster alike, could 
transform a system that is for all practical purposes a traditional cable 
system into ‘a copy shop that provides its patrons with a library card.’”188  
The Court also noted that Aereo’s commercial objectives were the same as 
those of the cable companies targeted by the 1976 amendments.189 
The Court then considered whether these individual performances were 
made to the public.  Quickly dismissing Aereo’s argument that its 
 
 182. Id. (quoting H. R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976)). 
 183. Id. at 2506 (“The Clause thus makes clear that an entity that acts like a CATV 
system itself performs, even if when doing so, it simply enhances viewers’ ability to receive 
broadcast television signals.”). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 2508 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 2507 (noting that Aereo subscribers select the content to be rerouted and 
streamed to their devices, whereas traditional cable subscribers tuned to frequencies where 
content had been made available already). 
 189. Id. 
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individual transmissions circumvented the public performance question, the 
Court noted that a transmission could be made through a set of actions.190  
The Court focused on the fact that the Transmit Clause provides that a 
performance could be made to the public “whether the members of the 
public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it . . . at the same 
time or at different times,” which makes it possible for performance to be 
made through one or several discrete communications.191  Furthermore, the 
Court noted that technological innovation allowing for simultaneous 
individual transmissions did not eviscerate the statutory protection.192 
The Court then noted that the subscribers to whom Aereo transmitted 
programs constituted “the public” for purposes of the statute.193  While the 
Act does not define the public, the Court noted, it does state that an entity 
performs publicly when it performs at “any place where a substantial 
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social 
acquaintances is gathered.”194 Moreover, the Transmit Clause language 
provides that an entity may perform publicly regardless of whether the 
members of the public receive it in the “same place or in separate places 
and at the same time or at different times.”195  Taken together, the Court 
reasoned, these provisions support the finding that Aereo transmitted to the 
public every time its subscribers requested programming.196 
Before concluding, the majority addressed Aereo’s concern that the 
opinion might affect new technologies and limited its holding to the online 
retransmission of broadcast signals.197  The majority answered:  “Congress, 
while intending the Transmit Clause to apply broadly to cable companies 
and their equivalents, did not intend to discourage or to control the 
emergence or use of different kinds of technologies.”198  The Court 
carefully explained the limitations of its holding.  First, different providers 
only would be deemed to perform if they, too, transmitted 
contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds.199  Second, its holding 
applied only when copyrighted material was transmitted to the public.200  In 
declining to opine on how its holding would apply to technologies not 
squarely presented, the Court stated that it would wait for such a case and, 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 2509 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
 192. Id. (noting that “an entity may transmit a performance through one or several 
transmissions, where the performance is of the same work” and that “whether Aereo 
transmits from the same or separate copies, it performs the same work”). 
 193. Id. at 2509–10. 
 194. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
 195. Id. at 2510 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 2510–11 (“And we have not considered whether the public performance right 
is infringed when the user of a service pays primarily for something other than the 
transmission of copyrighted works, such as the remote storage of content.”). 
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in the meantime, commercial actors and interested entities were free to seek 
action from Congress.201 
B.   The Aereo II Dissent 
In dissent, Justice Scalia alleged that the majority distorted the Copyright 
Act. Like the majority, the dissent first considered whether Aereo 
“perform[ed]” at all.202  Instead of adopting the majority’s improvised 
“looks-like-cable-TV” standard, the dissent framed its analysis by 
considering the differences between direct and secondary liability—a 
distinction which would channel the claims into the correct analytical 
track.203  Noting that the networks claimed that Aereo directly infringed 
their public performance right, the dissent explained that Aereo could be 
held directly liable only if it “engaged in volitional conduct that violate[d] 
the Act”204 and if Aereo itself “trespassed on the exclusive domain of the 
copyright owner.”205 
To illustrate the volitional conduct requirement, the dissent considered 
whether Aereo’s services were more similar to those of a copy shop than a 
video-on-demand or cable service.206  A copy shop, it stated, provides a 
photocopier to patrons, who ultimately choose the content to duplicate.207  
The patron—not the copy shop—chooses the content and activates the 
copier; the copy shop simply responds to the patron’s requests.208  Because 
the copy shop does not select the content, it cannot be held directly liable if 
the customer were to make a copy of copyrighted material.209  Video-on-
demand services, by contrast, choose the content to provide (though they do 
respond automatically to user input like a copier does), and thus should be 
analyzed under a direct infringement framework.210 
The dissent then characterized Aereo’s activities.211  Admitting that 
Aereo was neither a copy shop nor a video-on-demand service, the dissent 
labeled Aereo “a copy shop that provides its patrons with a library card,” 
stressing that Aereo provides access to content, which the subscribers 
select.212  Importantly, the dissent noted, Aereo does not provide a 
 
 201. Id. at 2511. 
 202. Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 203. “Direct liability” applies when an actor engages in infringing conduct, while 
“secondary liability” holds defendants responsible for infringement by third parties. See id.  
See generally Irene M. Pla, This Picture Is Coming in Fuzzy:  Cartoon Network v. CSC 
Holdings Blurs the Line Between Direct and Secondary Copyright Infringement, 38 AIPLA 
Q.J. 85 (2010). 
 204. Aereo II, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (citing 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 9:5.50 (2013)). 
 205. Id. at 2513 (citing CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F. 3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 
2004)). 
 206. See id. at 2513. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See id. 
 210. See id. 
 211. See id. at 2514. 
 212. See id. 
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prearranged list of movies or shows—it just assigns an antenna, which 
intercepts freely available content, to each subscriber.213  Because Aereo 
does not choose the content, Aereo does not engage in any volitional 
conduct and thus does not “perform,” which was sufficient to end the 
dissent’s analysis on whether Aereo performed publicly.214 
After concluding that Aereo did not directly infringe the networks’ public 
performance right, the dissent continued to critique the majority’s “looks-
like-cable-TV” standard.215 In particular, the dissent considered how the 
majority’s reasoning glossed over key differences between Aereo and the 
CATV systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter, which led to the 
unfounded conclusion that Aereo should come within the realm of the 1976 
Copyright Act.216  Cable companies, the dissent noted, were “curators of 
content”—that is, they selected and imported signals and made 
programming available to subscribers.217  Aereo did not.218 
C.   A Dissent to the Dissent 
While the majority in Aereo II declined to address how its decision 
would impact other forms of technology, as the dissent pointed out, its 
analysis provided no criteria for when its new “looks-like-cable-TV” 
standard applies.219  The dissent considered that the majority may have 
suggested its new standard should apply when companies provide access to 
live cable television, but then considered how the standard could be 
circumvented easily by implementing a time-delay function into its 
streaming.220  The dissent also cautioned against the standard being 
interpreted more broadly, perhaps to capture companies that store live 
television broadcasts at a user’s discretion, as such a standard would 
capture many service providers that “obviously do not perform.”221 
Instead of adopting the majority’s standard and noting that this 
technology was not contemplated during the amendments to the 1976 
Copyright Act, the dissent again stressed that, if the Court wanted to adopt a 
rule, it should have adopted a framework modeled on whether an entity 
engages in volitional conduct that infringes the public performance right, 
rather than whether it looks like a cable television service.222  However, the 
dissent’s application of this test similarly falls short because it treats Aereo 
like a passive actor. 
 
 213. See id. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. at 2515. 
 216. See id. 
 217. See id. at 2515–16. 
 218. See id. at 2516. 
 219. See id. (“Making matters worse, the Court provides no criteria for determining when 
its cable-TV-lookalike rule applies.  Must a defendant offer access to live television to 
qualify?”). 
 220. See id. 
 221. See id. at 2517. 
 222. See id. 
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The dissent focuses primarily on the fact that Aereo does not choose the 
content it provides as a means of distinguishing it from cable companies.  
Likening Aereo to a copy shop that gives its patrons library cards, the 
dissent explains that Aereo can be used to obtain whatever broadcasts are 
already freely available—an interpretation that treats the subscriber as the 
performer because she chooses the content.  However, while Aereo 
customers presumably could access the same locally broadcast content 
themselves by installing their own antenna, Congress rejected the 
equivalency of companies and individuals, noting that “cable systems are 
commercial enterprises whose basic retransmission operations are based on 
the carriage of copyrighted program material,” which required them to pay 
copyright royalties.223  Moreover, courts have noted that a commercial 
entity cannot “stand in the shoes” of its customers and benefit from 
arguments that they might have.224  Thus, Aereo should not be permitted to 
claim that it provides the system by which its subscribers can access freely 
available content in an effort to avoid a protection designed to account for 
their activities. 
Like the majority, the dissent failed to provide a clear and workable 
standard that the courts should employ going forward.225  Instead, it 
cautioned that Congress was in the best position to revise the Copyright Act 
to account for changing technology.226 
III.   A PROPOSAL ON HOW TO SOLVE 
THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE CONUNDRUM 
As discussed above, the Aereo II Court’s decision leaves technology 
companies without a clear standard for determining whether they are 
performing publicly in violation of the Copyright Act.  This part examines 
the shortcomings of the Aereo II Court’s opinion, focusing on how the 
Court could have provided clearer guidance on the public performance 
doctrine.227  Part III.A analyzes alternative arguments that were not 
employed by the Aereo II Court.  Part III.B argues why the Aereo II Court’s 
holding was correct because it better satisfies copyright’s dual purposes.  
Part III.C proposes that the adoption of a compulsory licensing scheme for 
content transmitted by cloud-based service providers like Aereo and 
AereoKiller is not unduly burdensome for innovative companies and is 
therefore an appropriate remedy to adopt. 
 
 223. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra notes 76, 164 and accompanying text. 
 225. See Aereo II, 134 S. Ct. at 2517–18. 
 226. See id. at 2518. 
 227. See supra Part II.C.  Since Aereo I was decided, a local television station owner in 
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A.   The Aereo II Court’s Shortcomings 
As the Aereo II dissent noted, the majority’s opinion effectively created a 
new standard for cloud-based service providers that undoubtedly will be 
difficult to apply in the future.228  Though the Court was careful to limit its 
holding to Aereo’s technology,229 it is unclear how the “looks-like-cable-
TV” standard will apply to future technologies that potentially engage in 
public performances. 
Though the dissent criticized the majority’s use of congressional records 
to interpret the Copyright Act, the legislative history evinces intent to 
capture future technology.230  Like the services provided by RS-DVR and 
cloud streaming, copyright law has struggled with technological 
innovations since its inception and likely will never keep pace with 
technology.231  In light of this constant struggle, the policy stressed in the 
legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act was afforded an appropriate 
amount of weight in Aereo II to underscore the idea that, when a copyright 
statute is subject to multiple interpretations, the balance between 
technologically innovative companies and copyright holders should weigh 
in favor of the copyright holders.  Though courts had not explicitly 
endorsed this idea in the copyright context, they have declined to allow 
parties to capitalize on ambiguities in statutory language as a way to skirt 
liability in areas where the law was designed to protect copyright 
holders.232 
However, the majority glossed over the fact that, while technology will 
undoubtedly continue to outpace the law, it should not be condoned when it 
clearly has been developed to circumvent the law that cannot catch up.  
Though the Aereo II Court did not discuss this notion, the Court has 
endorsed this idea to an extent in prior cases, opining that the novelty of the 
means used by an innovative company did not diminish the Court’s duty to 
afford full public performance protection in a musical context.233  
Moreover, though not in the context of cloud service providers, courts have 
noted that “it would strain logic” to base public performance protection “on 
the mere method by which television signals are transmitted to the 
public.”234  It would go against these courts, then, to allow companies like 
Aereo to circumvent copyright law by technology, which Judge Chin aptly 
 
 228. See supra notes 216–18 and accompanying text. 
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 230. See supra Part I.C.2.c. 
 231. See supra Part I.C.2.c. 
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described as “an inefficient process of using thousands of individual 
antennas rather than one central antenna to take advantage of a perceived 
loophole” in the copyright law.235  Doing so would frustrate copyright’s 
purpose, as discussed in Part III.B. 
The Aereo II Court also declined to address that Congress actually 
contemplated applying the public performance doctrine to the future 
technologies on which it tried to avoid commenting. While the House 
Report addressed the streaming of programs from one source to many 
people, as the spread of cable television and the transmission of content 
from one antenna to many users spurred the amendments to the Copyright 
Act and thus provided the fodder for the House, it did not foreclose the 
application of the Transmit Clause to future technologies.  In fact, the 
House Report further clarified that the Transmit Clause applied to “all 
conceivable forms and combinations of wired or wireless communications 
media,” and that when “[a] transmission reaches the public in any form, the 
case comes within the scope of clauses (4) or (5) of section 106.”236  Thus, 
the Court had the opportunity to provide a standard for future technologies 
and simply declined to seize it. 
Perhaps more important than the arguments the Court left out is the fact 
that it did not explicitly address whether Aereo was a cable company.237  A 
necessary corollary of ruling that Aereo publicly performed like a cable 
company—after all, “for all practical purposes [Aereo operates as] a 
traditional cable system”238—should mean that Aereo is similarly entitled 
to the compulsory license available to those cable companies under § 111.  
While the Second Circuit has previously held that a similar system did not 
qualify as a cable system under the statute,239 it was within the Court’s 
discretion to examine Aereo’s system more closely in Aereo II. 
The Aereo II Court should have stated that Aereo’s system qualifies as a 
cable system because it fits within the definition under § 111.  Section 111 
provides that a cable system is: 
[1] a facility, located in any State, territory, trust territory, or possession 
of the United States, that [2] in whole or in part receives signals 
transmitted or programs broadcast by one or more television broadcast 
stations licensed by the Federal Communications Commission, and 
[3] makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, 
cables, microwave, or other communications channels to [4] subscribing 
members of the public who pay for such service.240 
Aereo fulfills each criterion and, like cable systems in the 1970s, transmits 
only locally available content.241  In addition to falling within the cable 
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company definition, Aereo, like cable companies, has the same concerns 
with negotiating for individual licenses that cable companies did before the 
adoption of § 111.242  By not explicitly labeling Aereo as a cable system, 
the Court effectively hammered a nail in its coffin:  if Aereo is outside the 
purview of § 111, it will have to negotiate for individual licenses—
undoubtedly an inefficient, if not impossible, endeavor. 
B.   The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Transmit Clause 
Will Help to Effectuate Copyright’s Dual Purposes 
While the Aereo II decision did falter on some levels, its holding will 
help to advance copyright’s purposes to an extent. As discussed in Part I, 
copyrights serve two purposes:  to benefit the public and to reward artists 
for their work.243  Because providing reasonable access to television is a 
public interest, it is important that courts consider the repercussions of 
allowing companies like Aereo and AereoKiller to retransmit content 
without paying fees, unlike cable companies, which pay statutory licensing 
and retransmission content fees for the content they retransmit, or 
broadcasters, which pay licensing fees.244  Copyright’s purposes of 
benefiting the public and protecting the copyright holder will be frustrated 
if (1) copyright holders withhold their works or (2) parties who fund these 
programs stop investing in them. 
One major concern of permitting Aereo and similar companies to 
transmit content without paying for it is that copyright holders will withhold 
their works if they are not compensated fully for them.245  Copyright 
holders threatened as much in the 1960s when their copyrights were being 
misappropriated by cable companies, and they began to withhold their 
products after feeling that copyright law favored cable operators over 
copyright holders.246  One study observes that copyright owners resorted to 
regaining control of their product by withdrawing their programs from 
over-the-air broadcast stations to prevent cable providers from carrying 
them, and even paid cable systems not to carry their programs.247  The same 
concern presents itself here, where copyright holders might similarly 
withhold their content if they are being denied protection.248  Moreover, 
copyright holders might seek redress not only from companies like Aereo 
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and AereoKiller, which made the particular transmissions, but also for the 
underlying copying that facilitated the transmission.249  Those entities 
might stop engaging in what are actually lawful activities if they are 
discouraged by the prospect of lawsuits.  In either case, the public will 
surely lose. 
While protection of a creator’s work is not the primary goal of 
copyright,250 declining to protect copyright holders may cause them to 
withhold valuable material at the public’s expense.251  By contrast, 
enforcing copyright protection encourages people to continue to act as 
artists and creators by allowing them to personally gain from their labor.252  
As the BarryDriller court explained, “[i]t is virtually axiomatic that the 
public interest can only be served by upholding copyright protections and 
correspondingly, preventing the misappropriation of skills, creative 
energies, and resources which are invested in the protected work.”253 
Another concern is that broadcasters might decline to keep as many 
programs available if they are losing viewers to Aereo and AereoKiller, 
which can charge small fees for accessing content because they are not 
required to account for licensing fees in their subscription costs.254  The 
public might also be adversely affected if companies can freely engage in 
activities that cost cable providers licensing fees, because such behavior 
might decrease the incentive that media companies have to invest in future 
works or advertising companies to invest in commercials.255   As the court 
noted in WPIX, Inc. v. Ivi, Inc.,256 “the quantity and quality of efforts put 
into creating television programming, retransmission and advertising 
revenues, distribution models and schedules—all would be adversely 
affected.”257  These concerns could be exacerbated, as Judge Chin 
describes, if other companies see Aereo and AereoKiller as “a blueprint” on 
how to avoid the Copyright Act’s licensing regime.258  These harms would 
not only be detrimental to the copyright holders themselves but could 
destabilize the entire cable industry at the expense of the public.  At the 
same time, however, a murky decision that does not put Aereo in a position 
to pay compulsory licenses threatens the public’s ability to access certain 
information.  Perhaps more importantly, it fails to provide a standard that 
other companies can follow and sends the message that companies should 
err on the side of caution, lest they be punished for possibly infringing 
innovation.  
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In addition to its own interpretation of the Copyright Act and the policy 
reasons for adopting the amendments to the 1976 Copyright Act, the 
Aereo II Court should have more thoroughly examined the implications of 
concluding that cloud-based service providers publicly performed without 
also providing a clearer categorization of these companies.  The Court 
should have labeled Aereo as a cable company, until Congress decides 
otherwise.  Ultimately, the Copyright Act should be revised again to more 
clearly capture cloud-based service technology. In particular, Congress 
should also adopt a new compulsory licensing scheme specific to cloud-
based service providers and their technology. 
C.   The Adoption of a Compulsory Licensing Scheme  
for Cloud-Service Providers Is an Effective Way to Reconcile Advances  
in Technology with Fundamental Copyright Protections 
Adopting a compulsory licensing scheme akin to the one developed in 
the 1976 Copyright Act would allow technology to continue to develop and 
simultaneously protect copyright holders.259  As in the case of the 
compulsory licensing scheme which was adopted almost forty years ago to 
address the concerns of copyright holders and broadcasters,260 a 
compulsory licensing scheme specific to cloud-based service providers or 
similar technology providers would still be favorable to them.  First, a 
compulsory licensing scheme would be cost effective and efficient for 
cloud-based service providers.261  Second, the compulsory licensing scheme 
could be developed in a way to balance the interests of the copyright 
holders and the cloud-based service providers in a way that would not 
frustrate technological innovation. 
In deciding how to address concerns in the cable industry, Congress 
examined two issues that were ameliorated by the compulsory licensing 
scheme.262  First, requiring cable operators to engage in free market 
negotiations might result in unfairly costly copyright licenses or perhaps no 
licenses at all, given that “big television networks, big television stations 
and big television program producers” had the upper hand.263  Second, 
Congress noted that the other alternative would require individual cable 
systems to bargain on a signal-by-signal basis; “given the numerous cable 
systems, channels, distant signals and programs,” these individual 
negotiations otherwise would have been cost and time prohibitive.264  These 
issues could resurface if cloud-based service providers were required to 
negotiate individually for the rights to stream every program that they make 
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available.  By contrast, paying a fee through a new compulsory licensing 
scheme would be relatively inexpensive when compared to the full cost of 
ad hoc copyright licenses combined with the negotiation costs for those 
licenses.265  In addition, a compulsory licensing scheme is the more 
efficient option for cloud-service providers, who would otherwise have to 
obtain negotiated licenses from each copyright holder.266 
Though the proposed compulsory licensing scheme for cloud-based 
service providers might have to encompass other types of technology, it 
should still operate in a way that does not unduly burden technologically 
innovative companies.  Similar to the current compulsory licensing scheme, 
the retransmission of certain content should be exempt from the new 
scheme to account for the fact that Aereo and AereoKiller provide content 
that could be accessed by subscribers through their own personal rooftop 
antennas.  Adopting this system would strike a fair balance:  it would not 
treat copyright holders unfairly, as they are already being compensated for 
the content broadcasted, but cloud-based service providers would still be 
subject to licensing fees when streaming nonexempt materials.  One 
proposed way to distinguish between exempt and nonexempt programs is 
geographically;267 such a method would require cloud-based service 
providers to freely access content available within a certain geographic area 
to be able to stream it to customers.  Another proposed way is based on 
viewership;268 such a method would require cloud-based service providers 
to pay more for streaming 50,000 “performances” of the Super Bowl but 
less for 100 performances of the local nightly news. 
While the current compulsory licensing scheme applicable to cable 
television broadcasts has been criticized lately,269 these criticisms are not 
applicable to the situation of cloud-based service providers and copyright 
holders.  For instance, since the compulsory licensing scheme was adopted 
in 1976, the cable television industry has seen the spread of large individual 
cable systems and, as a result of this growth, the increased ability to 
bargain.270  Thus, critics argue that the current need for a system that favors 
now-large and capable cable systems is inconsistent with the original need 
to provide an efficient way for small companies to negotiate with parties 
that had more power.271  However, as cloud-based service providers have 
yet to take over the viewership market and undoubtedly do not have the 
platform that cable companies do, the cloud-based service providers are 
more like the cable companies of 1976.   Moreover, the compulsory 
licensing scheme has been criticized as slow and inefficient.272  However, 
the often-critiqued Copyright Royalty Tribunal, which originally 
administered the compulsory licensing system, was phased out by the 
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Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel, which was then replaced with the 
Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004.273   This Act, 
which has come under less criticism than its predecessors, determines the 
rates and terms for statutory licenses and provides a framework for a new 
compulsory licensing scheme.274  In considering how to administer a new 
compulsory licensing scheme, Congress could look to the current 
framework, as well as to private schemes like those between companies like 
Broadcast Music, Inc. and music publishers, which seemingly have come 
under less scrutiny than the compulsory licensing act that governs cable 
television.275 
CONCLUSION 
Cloud-based service providers like Aereo and AereoKiller provide their 
subscribers relatively inexpensive and easy access to content.  However, 
they provide their services to the chagrin of local programmers. 
Until Congress clarifies the statutory language, the Supreme Court 
should continue to consider the legislative history and policy reasons for 
adopting the Transmit Clause to protect copyright holders in the face of 
different technologies.  Doing so would further copyright’s dual purposes of 
benefiting the public and spurring innovation.  A new compulsory licensing 
scheme could alleviate the current concerns of copyright holders and cloud-
based service providers, and Congress has the benefit of being able to build 
on its current compulsory licensing scheme for the cable television industry.  
Even so, amending the statute will not be an everlasting panacea.  Amidst 
all of this “cloudiness,” one thing remains clear:  evolving technology will 
continue to complicate the relationship between copyright holders and 
innovative companies.  Stay tuned. 
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